The line from the unsealed authorsβ filing that reached the top of Hacker News is a 2019 Slack message worrying that LibGen would look bad on Hacker News. It is vivid evidence that people knew. But knowledge is not an element of any of the five rulings the authors asked the judge for this month. The quotes their argument actually cites are about substitution, and the place where knowledge will count, willfulness and statutory damages, is a fight this motion leaves for later.
A headline said Xiaomiβs trillion-parameter MiMo-V2.6-Pro was trained for $3M. Xiaomiβs own report says something narrower: $2.6M for the reinforcement-learning run, with no hardware, hours or price behind it, and no cost at all for the thirty trillion tokens of pretraining. That narrower number is still the interesting one. The final stage of training now costs about nine times what DeepSeek spent on R1βs entire reasoning training.
Two federal courts looked at the same dispute between Anthropic and the Pentagon and reached opposite results a month apart. Both agreed Anthropic had no bad motive. The difference is two supply-chain statutes whose definitions differ by a handful of words. The D.C. Circuitβs reading of the broader one, which it says holds βat least as applied here,β would reach any AI vendor whose model is trained to refuse.
Meta says its AI glasses will process your data without anyone, including Meta, seeing it. The threat model and the audit behind that promise are about WhatsApp, not the glasses.
HarnessTax ran seven models through Claude Code, Codex and Pi and reported three findings. The studyβs own chart data, which carries its significance tests, supports the first: the harness moves cost. The other two, that success barely changes and that models do better outside their home harness, rest on gaps of one to seven attempts out of ninety, and nine of twelve is roughly what chance would hand you.
An OpenAI agent got into an Australian government Medicare statistics portal on 18 June. OpenAI found out on 11 August and told the government on 10 September, through the mailbox researchers use to report weaknesses in the agencyβs systems. The public learned on 24 September. The longest stretch is the 54 days before anyone noticed, but the 30 days after OpenAI knew are the ones a policy can do something about, and the channel it chose tells you how it classified the event.
Anthropic says Claude autonomously discovered a new family of phage enzymes with a CRISPR-like repeat array. Its technical report says the same campaign was run ten more times and the array was missed in every rerun. Both statements are true, and the useful finding sits between them: the model reliably recognizes the array when it reads the DNA, and whether it reads the DNA is up to the harness.
At the UN on 22 September the President said AI would hereinafter be called βSuper Intelligenceβ. The next day a Senate bill proposed making βartificial superintelligenceβ a federal crime. The word now names everything and almost nothing, while the definition every recent executive order actually uses has not moved.
Anthropic says Opus 5.5 costs 40% less than Opus 5. OpenAI says GPT-6 Sol costs 50% less than its predecessor. Both headlines depend on a number neither company prints for you: how much of your bill is cache reads. On a measured coding-agent mix the answers are about 44% and, against each other, about 29%.
Anthropic published an index of how much of its own AI research is now done by Claude, and put the methodology next to the number. The methodology is the interesting part. Claude performs every step that produces the 26% except the staff sampling and the final sum, the figure is the count of tasks sitting above a boundary the human raters themselves agreed on a third of the time, and the 90% interval around it spans roughly eleven points.
OpenAI announced an independent mathematics advisory group this morning, ten days after 27 Fields medalists said that using open problems as a benchmark is damaging their field. The independence is unusually well specified: not paid, free to publish unrequested advice, free to change its own membership. Then one closing sentence removes internal pace from the remit. Meanwhile the thing the group has been asked to help communicate, more than 100 resolved open problems, is public as a count and a pass-rate curve, with two of the problems actually named.
Version 3.1 of the Frontier Safety Framework defines a harmful-manipulation threshold as the power to change beliefs and behavior. A preprint published seven days earlier measured both in the same experiments, on nearly 15,000 people, and found the two effects uncorrelated: r = 0.05 in one study, r = 0.18 in the other. The conjunction in that sentence is carrying an assumption the evidence does not support.
Executive Order N-9-26 asks Californiaβs Government Operations Agency whether a frontier-model kill switch is feasible, and whether its efficacy could be βverified on an ongoing basis.β The answer is due in 59 days. The engineering field that has verified shutdown devices for decades has a method, and the methodβs own worked examples show it missing between 20 and 80 percent of the failures it is meant to catch.
TypeSafeβs Jev is billed as 193.6 times faster than frontier models. Outside tests measure 5 to 81 times faster. The gap is which rival sits in the denominator.
Metaβs TRIBE v2 predicts how a human cortex responds to video, sound, and speech. Its abstract cites over 1,000 hours of fMRI across 720 subjects, but the paperβs own table shows the model trained on 25 of them; the other 695 are the test. The launch pages also differ from the paper on resolution and on what to call the thing.